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Abstract
We present three economic arguments for cyberinsurance. First, cyberinsurance
results in higher security investment, increasing the level of safety for informa-
tion technology (IT) infrastructure. Second, cyberinsurance facilitates standards
for best practices as cyberinsurers seek benchmark security levels for risk man-
agement decision-making. Third, the creation of an IT security insurance market
redresses IT security market failure resulting in higher overall societal welfare.
We conclude that this is a signiﬁcant theoretical foundation, in addition to market-
based evidence, to support the assertion that cyberinsurance is the preferred mar-
ket solution to managing IT security risks.THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR CYBERINSURANCE
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We present three economic arguments for cyberinsurance.  First, cyberinsurance 
results in higher security investment, increasing the level of safety for information 
technology (IT) infrastructure.  Second, cyberinsurance facilitates standards for best 
practices as cyberinsurers seek benchmark security levels for risk management decision-
making. Third, the creation of an IT security insurance market redresses IT security 
market failure resulting in higher overall societal welfare.  We conclude that this is a 
significant theoretical foundation, in addition to market-based evidence, to support the 
assertion that cyberinsurance is the preferred market solution to managing IT security 
risks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has radically changed the way business is carried out and is fast 
dominating our professional and personal lives.
2  Internet traffic is growing at between 
200-600 percent per year, as tens of millions of people log on to the Internet every day.
3  
While U.S. retail sales increased a mere 5.4 percent in 2003, e-commerce sales surged 
26.3 percent to $54.9 billion in the U.S.
4  Overall, business-to-business e-commerce sales 
worldwide is expected to soar from $1.93 trillion in 2002 to $8.53 trillion in 2005.
5      
However, software vulnerabilities are extraordinarily pervasive resulting in the  
exposure of Internet businesses to a wide array of e-risks
6 as well as potential for e-
litigation
7 involving property damage, business interruption, defamation, invasion of 
privacy, theft of credit card numbers, malpractice and consumer fraud.  The rise in 
available cracker tools makes it easier to exploit these vulnerabilities.
8  High profile firms 
such as Microsoft, Amazon.com, eBay, Yahoo, CNN.com have been hit by denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks, rendering these firms to be unreachable over the Internet for 
                                                 
2 Brian D. Brown, Emerging Insurance Products in the Electronic Age, 31-FALL BRIEF 28 (2001). 
3 Robert Paul Norman, Virtual Insurance Risks, 31-FALL BRIEF 14, 15 (2001). 
4 U.S. Department of Commerce, Retail E-Commerce Sales in Fourth Quarter 2003 Were 17.2 Billion, Up 
25.1 Percent From Fourth Quarter 2002, Census Bureau Reports (For release Feb. 23, 2004), at 
http://www.census.gov/mrts/www/current.html (last visited April 24, 2004).  
5 Matthew Clark,  B2B E-Commerce Sales to Skyrocket (May 8, 2002), at 
http://www.enn.ie/news.html?code=7426802 (last visited April 24, 2004). 
6 Ernst &Young reported that 34% of the 1400 organizations surveyed admits of less-than-adequate ability 
to identify if their intrusions in their systems, and 33% admits of lack of ability to respond.  Insurance 
Information Institute, Computer Security-Related Insurance Issues (September 2003), at 
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/computer (last visited April 14, 2004). 
7 Potential e-litigation may also relate to product liability claims (e.g., incorrect configuration or negligent 
design of hardware and software); computer malpractice suits associated with negligent provision of 
services; denial-of-service flooding attacks and other security breaches; intellectual property violation; and 
domain name and meta-tagging controversies.  Norman, supra note 3, at 15.   
8 Nicholas A. Pascuillo, Insurance and High Technology:  CyberInsurance:  Consistency in Claims and 
Coverage Resolution, at http://www.whitewms.com/CM/Publications/publications141.asp (last visited 
April 23, 2004).  
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significant period of time.
9    Likewise the websites of the U.S. Senate, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the 
Department of Defense (DoD), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have been 
altered or rendered unreachable by crackers.
10  Surveys by Ernst & Young and the 
Computer Security Institute (CSI) reveal that 90% of businesses and government 
agencies have detected security breaches and 75% recognized financial loses from the 
breach.
11  The Love Bug virus (2000) affected 20 countries and 45 million users caused 
an estimated $8.75 billion in lost productivity and software damage.
12  Overall, InfoWeek 
estimated that computer viruses and hacking took an estimated damage of $266 billion in 
the United States and $1.6 trillion on the worldwide economy in 1999.
13 
A particular issue that this symposium is concerned with relates to privacy issues 
on the Internet.
14  Organizations and businesses that obtain online information should 
                                                 
9 Nancy Gohring, Cyberinsurance May Cover Damage of Computer Woes, SEATTLE TIMES (July 29, 2002), 
available at http://www.landfield.com/isn/mail-archive/2002/Jul/0133.html (last visited April 23, 2004). 
Timothy A. Vogel, Dealing With Cyber Attacks on Network Security, 48 PRAC. LAW 35, 36 (Apr. 2002). 
10 Vogel, supra note 9. 
11 Insurance Information Institute, supra note 6.  Theft of proprietary info brought the highest loss ($70.2 
million total loss), an average loss of $2.7 million.  The second most expensive was DoS attacks, which 
resulted in $65.6 million loses, up 250 percent from last year.  Id.; Susan E. Fisher, Seeking Full Protection 
for Net Asset, INFOWORLD (Oct. 5, 2001), available at http://webbytes.com/portfolio/text/iw100501.html 
(last visited April 23, 2004).  The FBI estimated that the average lost from network security breach in 1999 
is $142,000.   Daintry Duffy, Prepare for the Worst, DARWIN MAG. (Dec. 2000), available at 
http://www.darwinmag.com/read/120100/worst.html (last visited April 24, 2004).  Not only intrusions but 
even internal attacks can be a problem, as employees can obtain credit card data or the firm’s proprietary 
design.  Employee-related security losses represent 41percent of total loses.  Id.  
12 Insurance Information Institute, supra note 6.  
13 Tim McDonald, Report: Year's Hack Attacks To Cost $1.6 Trillion, ECOMMERCE TIMES (July 11, 2000), 
available at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/3741.html (last visited April 24, 2004).  Will 
Knight,  Hacking Will Cost World $1.6 Trillion This Year (July 11, 2000), available at 
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/security/0,39020375,2080075,00.htm (last visited April 24, 2004).  
14 Courts recognize four types of privacy invasion (1) intrusion upon a person’s solitude or private affairs; 
(2) revelation of embarrassing private facts; (3) publicity that puts him/her in a false light; and (4) 
appropriation of his/her name or likeness.  Wendy S. Meyer, Notes, Insurance Coverage for Potential 
Liability Arising from Internet Privacy Issues, 28 J. CORP. L. 335, 337-38 (2003) (citing Martic C. Loesch 
& David M. Brenner, Coverage on the Technology Frontier, CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LIABILITY 
LITIG. REP., Feb. 17, 1998, at 9; Joel E. Smith, Invasion of Privacy by Sale or Rental of List of Customers, 
Subscribers, or the Like, to One Who Will Use It for Advertising Purposes, 82. A.L.R. 3d 772, 773 (1978)).  
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have a responsibility to protect the confidentiality of the data,
15 yet few have 
satisfactorily installed sufficient safeguards to protect online data, especially credit card 
and social security number information.
16  The availability of privacy laws and 
regulations concerning Internet data suggests that courts will hold firms liable for harm to 
individuals.
17  The liability claims can arise from:  (a) torts action based on privacy 
violation, (b) breach of an implied contractual duty, (c) violation of regulations intended 
to safeguard privacy, and (d) federal legislation intended to safeguard personal data 
online.
18  With the growing concern over security on online data, it can be expected that 
there will be increased regulation of Internet privacy.
19 
In this symposium, several ideas have been examined as possible solutions to the 
security and privacy problems.  These ideas range from technology-based solutions
20 to a 




                                                 
15  Id. at 335. 
16 See, e.g., Hawking Cyberinsurance (Mar. 12, 2001), at 
http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/business/0,39023166,20208314,00.htm (last visited April 25, 2004) 
(reporting that during the 2001 World Economic Forum, crackers who espouse the globalization cause had 
breached databases acquiring the participants’ confidential data, including those of Microsoft Chairman 
Bill Gates and former U.S .Secretary of State Madeline Albright, and accessed credit card numbers for 
1,400 people.  See also Insurance Information Institute, supra note 6 (citing a 2002 survey by St. Paul 
Companies of 501 IT and risk managers at 460 U.S. companies which found that only 55 percent of the 
respondents said that they have reviewed existing coverages for e-risk coverage). 
17 Meyer, supra note 20, at 341. 
18 Meyer, supra note 20, at 338-41. 
19 Id. 
20 See, e.g., Lance J. Hoffman, An Architecture to Allow Metadata-Driven Legal and Economic Controls in 
Privacy Sensitive Systems, in THIS VOLUME (2004) (proposing that surveillance systems be designed to 
adhere to privacy principles).  
21 See Daniel J. Solove, The New Vulnerability:  Data Security and Personal Information, in THIS VOLUME 
(2004). 
22 See Susan W. Brenner, Should Criminal Liability Be Used to Secure Data Privacy?, in THIS VOLUME 
(2004) (examining the option of enacting “public welfare” type legislation to impose criminal sanctions for 
data privacy violation). 
23 See Jennifer Chandler, Tort Liability for Cyber Insecurity:  The Case of Distributed Denial of Service 




25 and fiduciary trust law
26).  These solutions all have the 
following feature in common:  they rely primarily on non-market remedies.   
In this work, we propose instead a market-based solution for improving Internet 
security and privacy from an economic incentives approach. Specifically, we articulate 
the economic rationale for cyberinsurance.  Section II argues that traditional insurance 
policies do not adequately address the new perils of the information economy, while 
section III, the main part of the paper, discusses the three economic arguments for 
cyberinsurance.  Section IV discusses the current emerging cyberinsurance practice, and 
Section V wraps our discussions with concluding comments. 
II.  TRADITIONAL INSURANCE POLICIES 
The insurance policies firms have traditionally relied upon are:  (a) business 
personal insurance (first-party policies); (b) business interruption policies; (c) 
commercial general liability (CGL) or umbrella liability insurance policies covering 
damages to third parties (including those arising from privacy violation); and (d) errors 
and omission insurance policies available to professionals to cover losses arising from the 
performance of the insured’s professional services.
27 
These traditional insurance policies are designed to cover the perils of fires, 
floods, and other forces of nature and do not expressly cover Internet risks.  Cyber-
properties are without physical form and damaging attacks on them do not leave any 
                                                 
24 See Raymond T. Nimmer, Data Control, Privacy and Transactional Information:  The Role of Contracts 
and Markets, in THIS VOLUME (2004). 
25 See Marcy E. Peek, Beyond Contract:  Utilizing Restitution to Reach Shadow Offenders and Safeguard 
Information Privacy, in THIS VOLUME (2004).  
26 See Lilian Edwards, The Problem with Privacy:  A Modest Proposal, in THIS VOLUME (2004).  
27 Anna Lee, Student Notes, Why Traditional Insurance Policies Are Not Enough:  The Nature of Potential 
E-Commerce Losses and Liabilities, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 84 (2001).  
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physical damage, thus resulting in disputes between insurers and firms as to what 
constitutes “tangible” property and “physical” damage.
28  Also, while most CGLs do not 
have worldwide coverage, most cyber-torts are international.
29  CGL policies usually 
stipulate a territory for coverage to apply, as well as where the action has to initiated; in 
contrast, it is an open question which court or state or country has jurisdiction over 
different Internet-related events.
30  In short, traditional insurance policies use terminology 
linking physical damage and tangible property and do not consider damage from non-
physical property (such data loss) since they are intangible.
31  
Thus, traditional insurance policies do not explicitly cover Internet risks.  While 
the insured want to stretch policies to include their Internet business, insurers consistently 
insist on the exclusion of cyber-losses from coverage.
32  This has resulted in costly 
litigation wars between insurers and their policyholders; insurers drafting more ironclad 
                                                 
28 In Retails Systems, Inc. v. CNA Insurance Companies, 469 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. App. 1991), the court 
ruled that computer taps and data are tangible property under the CGL since the data had permanent value 
and was incorporated with the corporeal nature of the tape.  In American Guarantee & Liability Insurance 
Co. v. Ingram Micro, Inc., Civ. 99-185 TUC ACM, 2000 WL 726789 (D. Ariz. April. 18, 2000), the 
Arizona court ruled that the loss of programming in a computer’s RAM constituted physical loss or 
damage.  Also, in Centennial Insurance Co. v. Applied Health Care Systems, Inc. (710 F.2d 1288) (7th Cir. 
1983), the court ruled in favor of the insured in a dispute concerning defective data processing and system 
failure which resulted in data loss.  However, in Lucker Mfg. v. Home Insurance (23 F.3d 808 [3d Cir. 
1994]), the Third Circuit ruled that the insured liability for the loss of design use was not loss of tangible 
property use.  So also, in Peoples Telephone Co., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 36 F. Supp. 2d. 1335 
(S.D. Fla. 1997) the Florida District Court ruled that Electronic serial numbers and mobile telephone 
identification numbers are not ‘tangible’ property. 
29 Matthew Crane, International Liability in Cyberspace, 23 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1 (2001) (“Cybertorts 
particularly difficult to reconcile with standard insurance policies.”)  Different countries have differing 
standards.  For instance, the EU Data Protection Directive has limits on what non-EU countries can do with 
data gathered online.  Id. at 3-4.  Moreover, even if a firm’s insurance policy expressly stipulate risk 
coverage, it is uncertain if this encompasses international torts.  Id. at 9. 
30 Joshua Gold, Insurance Coverage for Internet and Computer Relate Claims, 19 NO. 4 COMPUTER & 
INTERNET LAW 8 (Apr. 2002). 
31 Hazel Glenn Beh, Physical Loses in Cyberspace, 8 CONN. INS. J. 55, 55-68 (2002). 
32 Norman, supra note 3, at 15  (“Many insurance carriers already have gone on record as saying that Love 
Bug losses are not covered under traditional insurance products.”).   
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exclusions;
33 and insurers offering new insurance products to stack the case against 
inclusion.
34  Insurers are increasingly excluding e-risks from traditional insurance 
coverage.
35  The inadequacy of traditional insurance to deal with the new threats in the 
cyberworld brings to the fore the need for new insurance products specifically designed 
to cover the new perils of the Internet world. 
III. ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS FOR CYBERINSURANCE 
In this section, we present three primary economic arguments for cyberinsurance: 
1)  cyberinsurance increases IT safety; 
2)  cyberinsurance facilitates standards for best practices to be set at socially 
optimal levels; and 
3)  cyberinsurance solves a market failure and increase welfare in society. 
Suppose that the firm has an income in good state (I1
e) and there is a probability p 




e is the income in bad state) in case of a cyberattack.  
E-commerce losses may either be:  (a) direct losses from the attack or intrusion, (b) 
business interruption (loss of productive time) and reputation losses, or (c) third party 
liability (suits for damages associated with privacy, defamation, etc.).  All these potential 
losses are risks against which the firm would like to be covered for.  Hence, it can 
purchase cyberinsurance that will pay it s in the event that a cyberloss occurs and the 
price of insurance is γ per dollar of cover.  In the bad state (which occurs with probability 
                                                 
33 Daintry Duffy,  Safety at a Premium, CSO MAG. (Dec. 2002), available at 
http://www.csoonline.com/read/120902/safety.html (last visited April 23, 2004) ( “As of January 2002, the 
majority of insurers eliminated virus-related exposures from traditional property insurance because the 
reinsurance industry is concerned with a cyberhurricane affecting thousands of companies simultaneously 
with no geographic locus.”) 
34 Beh, supra note 31, at 77-80 (A court may justifiably conclude that the insured did not intend to 
purchase that type of coverage if a new policy clearly provides particular coverage.) 
35 Duffy, supra note 33.    
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p), the firm has utility associated with its income in the good state minus the loss and the 
expenditure for insurance plus the amount the insurer will pay the insured in the event of 
a loss:  U(I1
e-L
e-γs+s).  In the good state (which occurs with probability 1-p), the firm has 
utility associated with its income in the good state minus the expenditure on insurance):  
U(I1
e-γs).  Hence, the firm purchases insurance coverage such that it maximizes its 
expected utility from both the good and bad states: 
). ( ) 1 ( ) ( max arg * 1 1 s I U p s s L I pU EU s
e e e γ γ − − + + − − = =  
As shown in Figure 1, by purchasing insurance coverage of amount s, a firm 
moves from E to F:  it spends γs on insurance premiums so that in case a loss occurs, the 
insurer will pay out s.  The firm gains from purchasing cyberinsurance since it moves 
from point E to point F which is on a higher indifference curve.  The firm moves from 
point E (no insurance) to either to point F (full insurance) if γ = p (premiums are 
actuarially fair),
 36 or to point P (partial insurance) if γ > p (insurance prices are higher). 
 
Figure 1:  Expenditure on Cyberinsurance and Amount of Coverage 
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i.e., the firm will fully insure if the insurance company charges an actuarially fair premium.  
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A.  Cyberinsurance Increases IT Safety 
There are three ways a firm can protect itself against damages:  (a) self-protection, 
(b) self-insurance, and (c) outsourced insurance (cyberinsurance).  Both self-insurance 
and cyberinsurance are protection against loss or redistribution of income from “good 
state” to “bad state”, i.e., they are both designed to reduce the size of the loss.  The 
difference is that in cyberinsurance, the firm procures insurance from a third party while 
self-insurance is internal investment dedicated for use in the event of a loss.  In contrast, 
self-protection is an attempt to reduce the probability of any losses from occurring in the 
first place. 
  Self-protection (which is also called “loss prevention”) measures are like burglar 
alarms that reduce the probability of an illegal house entry.  In cyber-security, self-
protection may take the following form:  authentication processes, anti-virus software, 
firewalls, virtual private networks, intrusion detection systems, vulnerability scans, 
system backups, and official security policies explicitly stating unacceptable behaviors. 
Self-insurance (also called “loss protection”) schemes are like sprinkler systems 
that reduce the loss from house fires.  The following measures reduce the size of a loss in 
cybersecurity case:  IT staffs who restore data and normal functions, software backup 
strategies, disaster recovery planning, and any investment or purchase of equipments or 
services that reduce the potential loss. 
We seek to show that:  (a) cyberinsurance and self-protection are “complements”,  
  10
(cyberinsurance increases self-protection),
37  (b) cyberinsurance and self-insurance are 
“substitutes” (an increase in expenditures on one would decrease the amount spent on the 
other), and (c) self-insurance decreases self-protection (the “moral hazard problem”)
38.   
  Cyberinsurance results in higher investment in security, increasing the level of 
safety for IT infrastructure.  New insurance products may make the Internet a safer 
business environment because cyberinsurers can require businesses to undertake loss self-
protection activities, as well as tying premiums to claims histories.
39  Like in fire 
prevention, aviation, boiler and elevator safety where insurance generated safety 
improvements,
40 cyberinsurers can proactively tie premiums to the insured firm’s 
investment in security processes and create market-based incentives for e-business to 
increase their level of IT safety.   
Thus, contrary to the moral hazard argument that insurance will result in 
reduction in self-protection, investment in IT security is higher with cyberinsurance than 
without cyberinsurance, because cyberinsurance and loss prevention activities can be 
made “complements”.
41  That is, the presence of cyberinsurance increases the amount 
                                                 
37 Self-protection is encouraged if the price of insurance is negatively related to the amount of self-
protection.  Overall, the optimal amount of self-protection is likely to be larger with cyberinsurance than 
without cyberinsurance if p is not very small.  Isaac Ehrlich & Gary Becker, Market Insurance, Self-
Insurance, and Self-Protection, 80 J. OF POL. ECON. 623 (1972).   
38 The term “moral hazard”, also known as the hidden action or principal-agent problem in economics 
concerns actions of a party that may be unobserved by the other parties which could result in negligence by 
the former.  In cyberinsurance, this may arise from the fact that it may be more cost effective for companies 
to purchase insurance to cover the risk of security breaches than to continuously improve their computer 
systems to keep up with the increasing sophistication of the hackers.  Hence, they may be lax in their 
security efforts, as it may be less expensive to procure insurance than to keep on improving their IT 
security.  Meyer, supra note 14, at 347-48.  However, this may be prevented by cyberinsurers tying the 
firm’s premium to their level of self-protection. 
39 Beh, supra note 31, at 80-81.  So too, insurers can pool knowledge about risks, identify system-wide 
vulnerabilities, demand that the insured undergo prequalification audits, and adopt pro-active loss 
prevention strategies.  Id.     
40 Jeffrey Kehne, Note, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives:  Financial Responsibility 
for Hazardous Waste, 96 YALE L.J. 43, at n. 12-14  (1986).  
41 See Ehrlich & Becker, supra note 37.  
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spent on self-protection as an economically rational response to the reduction of 
insurance premium, and thus results in higher levels of IT security in society.  Thus, 
insurers can insist that software companies deliver safe products and exert pressure on 
software engineering practices to improve in order to decrease exposure to various 
claims.  In addition, the insurance companies have an incentive to monitor hackers in 
order to minimize the amount of damage they would have to pay out to its insured firms.  
Hence, private enforcement by insurance companies would supplement enforcement by 
the firms and agents of law enforcement. 
As shown in Figure 2, a firm has a choice between self-insurance (associated with 
the bowed-out transformation curve) and cyberinsurance (associated with the straight 
lines representing the insurance prices).  The transformation curve is bowed-out because 
of the “law of diminishing marginal returns” to investment in self-insurance products - 
each additional dollar of good-state income invested on self-insurance is less productive 
than the previous dollar invested. 
Starting at point E, a firm facing an actuarially fair price would move from E 
toward S1 (via self-insurance) or from S1 to point F (via cyberinsurance).  If, however, 
insurance prices increase – as represented by a steeper price line – the firm would instead 
have self-insurance up to point S2 and cyberinsurance up to point F.  Thus, as a result of 
the increase in the insurance prices, the amount of self-insurance increases by the 
horizontal distance between S1 and S2 (represented by A), and the amount of 
cyberinsurance would decrease by the horizontal distance between points F and G  
  12
(represented by B).
42  This demonstrates how self-insurance and cyberinsurance are 
substitutes. 
 
Figure 2:  Self-insurance and Cyberinsurance as Substitutes
43  
         
Self-insurance, unlike cyberinsurance, has been known to create a moral hazard.  
Generally, if the price of insurance is independent of the expenditures in self protection, 
the reduction in the probability of the hazard would be exactly offset by the increase in 
the “loading factor” (roughly, the insurer’s profit spread per dollar of coverage), which in 
turn reduces the demand for self-insurance.  In this case, self-insurance and self-
protection are likely to be “substitutes,” that is, the availability of one discourages the 
other.
44  Since the price of self-insurance is independent of the probability of loss, one 
would see either a large demand for self-insurance and a small demand for self-
                                                 
42 Id. at 636. 
43 The figure is adapted from Ehrlich & Becker, supra note 37, at 635. 
44 Id. at 642-43.  
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protection, or the converse.
45  In contrast, cyberinsurance can actually increase self-
protection since the price of cyberinsurance can be tied to the level of self-protection by 
the insured.  Figure 3 graphically represents these relationships.  We can conclude that 
since self-insurance creates a moral hazard, and self-insurance and cyberinsurance are 
substitutes, cyberinsurance is better than self-insurance in increasing Internet security 
(since cyberinsurance can increase self-protection if premiums are tied to the level of 
loss-prevention activities as an incentive to encourage higher self-protection care). 
 
  Figure 3:  Cyberinsurance, Self-Insurance and Self-protection 
 
 
B.  Cyberinsurance Facilitates Standard for Liability  
to be Set at Socially-Optimal Level 
Society can use three separate policy tools to deter accidents or torts:  liability 
rules (which are implemented through the court system), safety standards (which are 
imposed by regulation), and insurance (a market mechanism).  With regard to liability 
                                                 
45 Id.  
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rules, one objective is that of providing efficient incentives for product safety.
46  On one 
hand, the liability rules can be used as a Pigouvian tax
47 to deter the harm or internalize 
the damages caused by the injurer (or faulty product manufacturer) to the victim (or 
consumer).  When one party is made liable for injury caused to another, an externality 
has been internalized.   On the other hand, the imposition of the “liability tax” on 
suppliers of risky goods and services results in alteration of economic activity; suppliers 
can be discouraged to innovate or possible new products may be set aside for fear of 
liability exposure.
48  The question is whether liability has become too expansive.
49 
Because IT security uses up resources in society, which can be utilized in more 
productive endeavors, more security is not necessarily always better.  Figure 4
50 below 
shows the socially optimal-level of precaution.   Thus, if we let p be the probability of a 
cyber-attack, x the amount of precaution, L the monetary value of the loss from a cyber-
attack, and w the cost of precaution (per dollar of unit), the expected social costs equals 
the costs of precaution plus the expected cyber-loss:  SC  =   wx+p(x)L. 
The line p(x)L is downward-sloping because increased precaution decreases 
expected losses.  However, extra precaution also increases costs (that is why the line wx 
                                                 
46 The other objective is to compensate the victim.  Carl Shapiro, Symposium on the Economics of Liability, 
5 J. OF ECON PERSPECTIVES 3, 5 (1991). 
47 Arthur C. Pigou (1877-1959), a British economist and Professor of Economics at Cambridge University 
who pioneered welfare economics, wrote in his influential work, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (first 
published in 1920) about the divergence of social and private costs and benefits.  To correct for this, he 
proposed the imposition of a tax on externalities.  Thus, a Pigouvian tax is one enacted to correct the effects 
of negative externalities.  Ronald Coase in The Problem of Social Cost, J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960), proposed 
instead the definition of proprietary rights to correct the externalities problem when transaction costs are 
low.  
48 For instance, it has been estimated that liability costs represent 17 percent of the Philadelphia mass transit 
fares and from 15-25 percent of the price of a new ladder.  With this, some products or services (such as 
some park rides and swimming pools diving boards at motels) have just vanished.  Kip Viscusi, Product 
and Occupational Liability, 5 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 71 (1991). 
49 Shapiro, supra note 46, at 5. 
50 This graph and subsequent discussions are drawn from ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, 300-316 (3d ed. 2000).  See also STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 
(1987).  
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is upward-sloping).  The socially-optimal level, x*, in Figure 4 (where the total social 
cost costs are at minimum), is achieved by striking a balance between the gain from the 
additional investment in security and the cost associated with extra security:
51 
w            =      - p’(x*)L 
(marginal social cost)      (marginal social benefit) 
 
                                Figure 4:  Socially-Optimal Precaution Level 
This optimal level can, in theory, be implemented through the use of a liability 
rule under any of three different regimes: (a) no liability regime,
52 (b) strict liability, and 
(c) negligence rule.
 53  In general, if the potential victim (but not the injurer) can take 
                                                 
51 One cost of IT security is its trade-off with convenience.  The rule in IT is that security is inversely 
proportional to convenience.  Colleen Brush, Surcharge for Insecurity, at 
http://www.esmartcorp.com/Hacker%20Articles/ar_surcharge_for_insecurity.htm (last visited April 23, 
2004).  
52 § 230 of the Communication Decency Act (CDA) (47 U.S.C. § 230) protects Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) from libel claims resulting from defamatory materials posted by subscribers and the Digital 
Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA) (17 U.S.C. §512(c) (2003)) shields ISPs from liability associated with 
hosting any form of material which infringes some copyright.  Thus, in Zeran v. America Online (AOL), 
Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997),  the court held that AOL is not liable for defamatory messages posted by 
an unidentified third party.  But see Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co., N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 
1995).  Cf. generally infra n.61. 
53 In some sense, both no liability and strict liability are just special cases of the negligence rule:  in the 
latter the due care is set so high that no injurers can meet it, while in the former the due care is set so low 
that all injurers meet it.  See Shapiro, supra note 46, at 6.  
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precaution, then no liability regime is optimal.
54  If, on the other hand, the injurer (but not 
the victim) can take precaution, strict liability with perfect compensation results in 
efficient precaution, by causing the injurer to internalize the marginal costs and benefits 
of precaution.
55  However, when both the injurer and the victim can take precaution, 
neither no liability nor strict liability standard can erase the problem of inefficient 
incentives.  In this case, a negligence rule where the legal standard is equal to the 
efficient level of care results in efficient precaution.   
For example, in the case of a simple negligence rule (illustrated in Figure 5 
below), the optimal level of precaution is x*.  Society can set the rule that the injurer is at 
fault whenever  xi falls below x* -- this is the forbidden zone in Figure 5 where 
precaution by the potential injurer is deficient.  Hence, whenever xi < x*, the injurer is 
liable.  Otherwise, if xi is equal to or in excess of x*, the injurer is not at fault, and 
therefore, the injurer is not liable (this corresponds to the permitted zone in the figure).  
Since in most cybersecurity cases, both the potential injurer and victim can take 
precaution, a negligence rule with the legal standard equal to the efficient level of care 
                                                 
54 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 302-03.  The victim chooses the level of precaution that minimizes 
his/her total costs which occurs when his/her marginal costs is equal to his/her marginal benefit.  The rule 
of no liability causes the victim to internalize the marginal costs and benefits of precaution, which gives the 
victim incentives for efficient precaution.  If only the victim can take precaution, a strict liability rule with 
perfect compensation results in zero precaution.  Id. at 303-04.  
55 Id.  If the injurer (but not the victim) can take precaution, a no liability rule yields zero precaution.  The 
injurer externalizes the benefits of precaution.  Id.  A rule of strict liability with deficient compensation 
(D<L) results in the injurer externalizing a fraction of the harm, and does not provide incentives for 
efficient precaution by the injurer.  Id. at 305, n.8.  
For an example of strict liability regime, see Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9627, 9651-9675, 6911a (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 26 
U.S.C. §§ 4611-4612, 4661-4662 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (enacting a retroactive strict liability regime 
to address concerns pertaining to the formation and disposal of hazardous wastes).   
Meyer, supra note 14, at 344-45.    
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results can theoretically result in efficient precaution.
56  
 
Figure 5:  Simple Negligence Liability Rule
57 
In theory, the liability system can result in efficient precaution if x* is set at just 
the right amount.  However, the costs of bringing a liability suit are high.
58  There is some 
empirical evidence – for example in the health care industry – suggesting substantial 
costs related to enforcement of liability rules:  less than half of money paid for liability 
insurance actually reached the victims, while 80 percent of the premiums are returned to 
the insured in the form of benefits.
59  Liability rules also do not work for many injuries 
where losses are smaller than the costs of bringing an action.
60  For cybersecurity in 
particular, litigation costs may be potentially high since the question of whether a victim 
                                                 
56 See Chandler, supra note 23 (suggesting the imposition of negligence-based liability against the 
manufacturer of a software that falls below the standard of security). 
57 The figure is adapted from COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 307. 
58 Shapiro, supra note 46 at 5. 
59 Shapiro, supra note 46, at 7. 
60 Kehne, supra note 40, at 410.  
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of a computer intrusion can be held liable for damage done by the cracker to others, is 
still not a settled issue.
61  Another danger is that the expansion of liability can coincide 
with the increased regulatory standards, particularly when liability and regulatory rules 
are not coordinated.
62   
Yet, there are also problems associated with a regulatory regime, not the least of 
which is the information requirement necessary to quantify the risks in order to set the 
regulatory standard at the right level.  Rule-makers are not subject to market pressures for 
precise risk categorization and are not always exact in their appraisal of long-term latent 
risks.
63  If the regulation overshoots the estimate, i.e. set a standard higher than is 
socially-optimal, innovation can be dampened.  If, on the other hand, the standard is set 
too low, accidents and products defects will not be sufficiently deterred.  Also, regulatory 
agencies may be susceptible to lobbying by powerful interest groups, as those opposed to 
stricter standards may obstruct or slow down regulation changes.
64  In addition, the 
administrative costs of updating regulation are far higher than adjusting premium rates.
65 
                                                 
61 For instance in the case where e-commerce sites are being targeted by hacktortionists, some believe that 
the real party at fault are firms not patching their systems.   If network administrators kept tab the security 
alerts and routinely patch their systems, the impact of these vulnerabilities would be lessened.  Lawrence 
M. Walsh, On the Cutting Edge (April 2001), available at  
 http://infosecuritymag.techtarget.com/articles/april01/departments_news.shtml (last visited April 23, 
2004).  Some others believe that the real culprit is Microsoft’s software holes that needed patching because 
the hacktortionist targeted U.S. e-commerce sites using unpatched NT and IIS Web servers.  Brush, supra 
note 51.  However, some argue that it may not be reasonable for a court to hold  Microsoft liable in a tort 
claim for damages caused by Code Red II worm if the system administrator failed to patch a system after 
Microsoft made such a patch publicly available.  Vogel, supra note 9, at 39-40.  But cf. generally supra 
n.52 (ISPs shielded by legislation from liability). 
62 Viscusi, supra note 48, at 72. 
63 Kehne, supra note 40, at 410-11. 
64 Kehne, supra note 40, at 411 & n. 29, citing Noll, The Economics and Politics of Regulation, 57 VA. L. 
REV. 1016, 1028-32 (1971); P. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981) 
(“Well organized opponents of controls may ‘capture’ the agencies that regulate them and exert direct 
pressure on the content of regulations.  [They] may also … influenc[e] the information that the agency 
chooses to collect and the problems it chooses to investigate”). 
65 Id. at 412.  
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This is where market-based deterrence can offer definite advantages.  Because of 
pooling of information and superior expertise in assigning proper prices to risk as well as 
in developing safety standards, insurers have better knowledge in setting this level of care 
as compared to regulators coping with complex technical issues.
66  Since precise risk 
categorization requires a predictable relationship between safety practices and liability, 
the use of the insurer’s superior information in adopting the right level of reasonable care 
allows insurers to cause firms to set loss prevention measures to efficient levels.  Thus, 
market-based pricing of risk and precaution can at least augment regulatory standards and 
can internalize the costs and benefits associated with IT security better than a case-by-
case application of the “Learned Hand” formula.
67  This could be done by cyberinsurers 
requiring the insured firms to set their loss prevention activities equal to the level that 
will bring about the socially efficient level of care.  Insurance companies can thus 
facilitate standards for best practices by calibrating the amount of IT security they require 
the insured to possess to socially-optimal levels.
68   
In sum, because of the high transaction costs associated with the liability system, 
as well as the problems associated with a regulatory regime (insufficient expertise in 
characterizing risk, political lobbying, and high administrative costs), market-based 
incentives such as cyberinsurance are a better alternative than either a liability or 
regulatory system at deterring harm and setting IT security at the socially-efficient level. 
                                                 
66 Kehne, supra note 40, at 410 (“To operate profitably, insurers must maintain strong incentives for 
underwriters to assess risks accurately.”) 
67 See U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).  Judge Learned Hand’s rule can be 
reformulated as:  the injurer is negligent if the marginal cost of his/her precaution is less than the resulting 
marginal benefit.  COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 313-14). 
68  Thus, for instance, insurers have lobbied considerably for mandatory air bags in automobiles and 
pressured the government to force industries to change.  Beh, supra note 31, at n. 130 citing Robert 
Kneuper & Bruce Yandle, Auto Insurers and the Air Bag, 61 J. RISK & INS. 107 (1994), available at 1994 
WL 13386236.  
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C.  Cyberinsurance Increases Social Welfare 
 
The current level of uncertainty under traditional insurance policies results in 
under-investment in insurance, and thus an insufficient amount of profit-smoothing by 
firms and an inefficient level of risk-sharing throughout society.  The absence of markets 
for bearing new Internet risks lowers the welfare of those who find it advantageous to 
transfer those risks, as well as those who, because of pooling and superior expertise, are 
willing to bear such risks.
69  Thus, a market failure exists due to “non-marketability” (or 
the absence of markets for bearing of Internet risks).  To overcome the lack of optimality 
due to non-marketability, a cyberinsurance market can be created.  Hence, the creation of 
cyberinsurance solves a market failure
70 and results in higher welfare for society.   
The amount of welfare gains associated with the introduction of cyberinsurance 
can be calculated in dollar terms for varying levels of risk aversion and the probability of 
a cyber-attack occurring.  By comparing the market value of income in the first-best case 
with full cyberinsurance with the situation when there is no cyberinsurance, we are able 
to provide dollar estimates of the value of insurance to society.  The market value of 
income (which, in Table 6 below, is the y-intercept of the “budget line” tangent to the 
indifference curve) can be used as a measure of welfare.  By comparing the market value 
of income in the “no cyberinsurance” era to that of the “with cyberinsurance” era, we are 
                                                 
69 Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 946 
(1963).  
70 In general, a market failure exists if any of the three conditions for the equivalence of competitive 
equilibria and social-optimality fail to hold.  These conditions are: (a) existence of markets (i.e. 
“marketability” of all goods and services relevant to costs and utilities); (b) existence of some set of prices 
which will clear all markets (i.e., existence of competitive equilibrium); and non-increasing returns.  Id. at 
942-44.  In this case, the absence of markets for the bearing of Internet risks results in a violation of 
condition (a) and results in a reduction in welfare below that fully-obtainable by society.    Creating 
markets for the bearing of e-risks plugs the loophole.  
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able to calculate the welfare gains.  This approach is similar to that of measuring welfare 
gains from trade in international macroeconomics.
71 
In the next section, we develop a general methodology for calculating welfare 
gains from cyberinsurance and perform calculations for specific examples. 
1.  General Methodology for Measuring Welfare Gains from Cyberinsurance 
 
In Figure 6, the firm starts at point E (without cyberinsurance), which is 
associated with the lower indifference curve.  If there is a cyberinsurance market, the firm 
can go to point F by buying insurance at the price γ per dollar of cover.  In this case, the 
firms pay the insurer I
e
1-I* and if the attack occurs, the cyberinsurer pays the insured 
firms I*-I
e
0.  By entering into this trade, the firms are able to attain a higher indifference 
curve by (fully) insuring.  A measurement of welfare change is line  B A (the difference 
between the y-axis intercepts of the “budget lines” tangent to those level curves).
72 
                                                 
71 See Earl L. Grinols & Kar-Yiu Wong, An Exact Measure of Welfare Change, 24 No. 2 CAN. J. OF ECON. 
428 (1991); Earl L. Grinols, A Thorn in the Lion’s Paw: Has Britain Paid Too Much for Common Market 
Membership?, 16 J. OF INT’L ECON. 271 (1984); Douglas A. Irwin, The Welfare Costs of Autarky:  
Evidence from the Jeffersonian Trade Embargo, 1807-1809, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE, MIMEO (2002); Daniel 
M. Bernhofen & John C. Brown, Estimating The Comparative Advantage Gains from Trade:  Evidence 
from Japan, WORKING PAPER (2003); FEENSTRA, ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL TRADE (forthcoming). 
72 Note that the level surfaces are maximized exactly at the intersection of the “budget lines” with the 45
o-
line, as a particular characteristic of expected utility optimization:  
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   at  I1=I0.  Also, if we assume constant relative risk aversion, the utility function 
are homogenous, which means that the lines tangent to the utility curves are parallel.  See CARL P. SIMON & 
LAWRENCE BLUME, MATHEMATICS FOR ECONOMISTS (1994) for a general discussion of homogenous 
functions in economics.  
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Thus, from the figure, we can implement the measurement of welfare gains  B A  
with the following steps:                              
 
Figure 6:  Measuring Welfare Gains 
Step 1:  Get data on income in good (I
e
0) and bad (I
e
1) states. 
Step 2:  Get data on p (the probability of an attack) and γ (premium per dollar of 
cover), and calculate A.  Here, we assume actuarially fair premiums. 
Step 3:  Assume a particular parametric form of the utility function, and then 
calculate U .  As is common in the macroeconomics and finance literatures, we assume a 
constant relative risk aversion among firms.  We calculate the gains for varying levels of 
risk aversion coefficient. 
Step 4:  Calculate I**. 
Step 5:  Calculate B and subtract from A.  This is our measure of welfare gains 
(the distance of line B A ).  
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2.  An Example:  Calculating Welfare Gains for Year 2000 DoS Attacks 
 
Step 1:        Gross Profit (2000)  From Yahoo!Finance 
Yahoo    $    951,759,000 
Ebay            335,971,000 
Amazon                655,777,000 




From The Yankee Group:  The companies’ lost revenues, lost market capitalization due to plunging 
stock prices, and the cost of systems security upgrades due to the DoS attack resulted in more than $ 
1.2 billion
73.  This means that I
e
1 = $ 3.143 billion (I
e
0 + the $ 1.2 billion damages). 
Step 2:  Since industry reports indicate that cyberinsurers charge premiums which 
range from $5,000 to $ 60,000 per $ 1 million of cover (depending on the extent of the 
risk and the assets and protection extended),
 74 we calculated for p=γ = 0.005, 0.01, .002, 
0.03, 0.04, 0.05, and 0.06.  As an example, in the case where p= γ  = .06,  I
e
1 = A – 0.06 
I
e
0  => $ 3.1435 Billion = A – 0.06*$ 1.9435 Billion => A = $ 3.2407 Billion. 
   Step 3:  As mentioned, it is common in the asset-pricing and macroeconomics 
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73  Russ Banham, Hacking It (Cyberinsurance)(Statistical Data Included)¸ CFO, MAG. FOR SENIOR FIN’L 
EXEC. (Aug. 2000), available at http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m3870/9_16/63916347/p1/article.jhtml 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2004).  Gohring, supra note 9. 
74 See Becca Mader, Demand Developing for Cyberinsurance, BUS. J. OF MILWAUKEE (Oct. 11, 2002), 
available at http://www.milwaukee.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/stories/2002/10/14/focus2.html (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2004). 
75 Note that for σ=1, the CRRA utility function is simply the log-utility function, which means the level 
curves are Cobb-Douglas utility function.  Also, in a two-“good” case, the level surfaces of CRRA utility 
function are constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility, where the elasticity of substitution 1/(1-ρ) is 
equal to the reciprocal of the risk aversion coefficient, and the log-utility case (σ=1) correspond to the 
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This means that the firm’s willingness to take risks (in percentage terms) is 
constant for all income levels.  In other words, the firm doesn’t become relatively more 
or less risk-averse across different levels of income.  The firm’s willingness to bear risks 








− = σ  which is known in 
the literature as the Arrow-Pratt
76 coefficient of (relative) risk aversion.  Higher σ’s are 
associated with higher risk aversion.
77  The general consensus in the literature is that 
reasonable levels of risk aversion is such that σ is anywhere from 1 to 3, so we calculate 
the welfare gains (and the premiums) for varying levels of risk aversion within that range, 
i.e. for σ = 1,1.5, 2, 2.5, 3. 
















Step 4:   For our example (σ = 2 and p= γ  = 0.06), we have 
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U   = >  U I − =
−1 * *    
=>   billion
U
I 0312 . 3 $
1 * * = − = . 
Step 5:  For the same example (σ = 2 and p= γ  = .06), we have
* * * * 06 . 0 I B I ⋅ − =  
   B=  1.06 (I*) = 1.06* $3.0312 billion = $ 3.2131 billion 
   Welfare gains = A-B = $ 47,040,870.76. 
                                                 
76 John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large, 32 ECONOMETRICA 122 (1964). 
77 For a general introduction on the economics of uncertainty, see HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (3d ed. 1992), at 173-192.   
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We performed the same calculations for σ=1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3 and p=γ=0.005, 0.01, 
0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06 with the results presented in Tables 1 and 2 below.  We 
calculated the welfare gains for both (a) DoS attacks against Yahoo, Ebay, and 
Amazon.com, and (b) worldwide virus and hacking attacks.  As the tables show, the 
welfare gains from the presence of a cyberinsurance market can be quite substantial.  For 
instance, assuming constant relative risk aversion and actuarially fair prices, we 
calculated that in the case of the DoS attacks against Yahoo, Ebay and Amazon, the 
availability of cyberinsurance would have resulted in welfare gains to the insured firms 
by as much as $78.7 million for a firm with a high degree of risk aversion (σ=3) facing a 
high probability of an attack (p=γ=0.06).  Overall, we calculate that had cyberinsurance 
been available, the welfare gains associated with insuring worldwide security breaches 
and virus attacks in 2000 would be had been as much as $13.16 billion.  Our calculations 
of the welfare gains are broken down for various levels of risk aversion and probabilities 
of cyber-attack occurring.   
3. Calculating  Cyberinsurance  Premiums 
We also calculate the total premium that the insured would be willing to pay for 
varying levels of risk aversion and attack probabilities.  Following Cochrane (1997),
 78 
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78 John H. Cochrane, Where is the Market Going? Uncertain Facts and Novel Theories, 21 ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 3 (1997).  
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calculations, we calculated the premiums for σ=1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3 and p= γ  = 0.005, 0.01, 
0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06.  Our results are presented in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Table 1:  Premiums and Welfare Gains:  Year 2000 DoS Attacks (in $Mn) 
 
                 Risk Aversion Parameter σ =                       1                1.5                   2                  2.5             3 
Premiums                                 p=γ=0.005 
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Table 2:  Worldwide Cyberinsurance Premiums and Welfare Gains (in $Bn) 
 
                 Risk Aversion Parameter  σ =                      1                  1.5                  2                 2.5             3 
Premiums                                 p=γ=0.005 
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IV.    EMERGING CYBERINSURANCE MARKET 
The emerging practice in the new cyberinsurance market
79 seems to match our 
                                                 
79 The new cyberinsurance  products can cover several areas including loses arising from (a) DoS attacks 
(b) e-business interruption; electronic theft of sensitive information; (d) cyberextortion; (e) cybersquatters 
who occupy domain names; (f) consultants giving wrong recommendation; (g) product liability suits such 
as improper processing or reporting of data; (h) sensitive data falling into the wrong hands, contaminated or 
destroyed data resulting in financial loss to consumers; (i) content defamation; (j) copyright and trademark 
infringement; and (k) privacy suits.  Preston Gralla, Electronic Safety Net:  Cyberinsurance Policies Can 
Offer Protection When Technology Fails, CIO MAG. (Dec. 1, 2001), available at 
http://www.cio.com/archive/120101/et_article.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2004).  Some examples of these 
products include NetSecure by Marsh (see Hawking Cyberinsurance (Mar. 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/business/0,39023166,20208314,00.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2004); 
American International Group (AIG), Inc.’s NetAdvantage Security (covering damages arising from  
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theoretical predictions.  For example, related to our discussion on IT security and 
premium-induced self-protection, cyberinsurers in developing coverage have required 
applicants to provide either:  (a) costly top-to-bottom physical and technical analysis of 
security, networks, and procedures,
80 or (b) fill in a detailed online questionnaire 
comprising of about 250 queries,
81 to assess an applicant’s security risks and 
cyberprotections (technology budget, security infrastructure, virus-protection programs, 
testing and safety procedures, and outsourcing).  This allowed firms to assess their risks 
and become better aware of their security needs and also allowed insurers to engage in an 
ongoing dialogue with the firms about their security risks.  Insurance coverage to firms 
with less cyberprotections, with a greater percent of its business online, or in a highly-
                                                                                                                                                 
hacking, viruses, cyber-extortion, loss of revenue, and  damage to intangible property), NetAdvantage (for 
copyright infringement, libel, and content liabilities); and NetAdvantage Pro (for professional liability for 
companies with services provided over the Internet); J.H. Marsh  & McLennan’s NetSecure; Sherwood’s e-
Sher (See Lee, supra note 27, at 89); Chubb’s SafetyNet; Lloyds of London’s e-Comprehensive or 
Computer Information and Data Security Insurance, Fidelity and Deposit’s E-Risk Protection Program (See 
Brown, supra note 2, at 33), and products by St. Paul Companies, CNA, InsureTrust.com (See Lee, supra 
note 27), and Zurich North America (See Russ Wiles, Cybercrime Insurance Growing, ARIZ. REP. (Sept. 
15, 2003), available at http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/business/articles/0915insure15.html (last 
visited April 23, 2004).  Firms who recently bought new cyberinsurance products cite as among its 
advantages:  (a) cyberinsurance allows the firm to transfer the risk to an insurers so they feel sheltered with 
the robust protection;  (b) cyberinsurance not only offers monitoring but allows the e-insurer to take fast 
action against a threat; (c) the benefit of having its systems monitored 24/7/365 by a knowledgeable 
professional ; (d) expediency, since traditional insurance do not provide adequate protection against 
hacking and other e-risks. 
80 How a typical step-by-step formal assessment may be done is shown in this PDF document 
http://common.ziffdavisinternet.com/download/0/2274/Baseline-NetDiligenceMap.pdf  (last visited April 
24, 2004), in Eileen Mullin, Project Map:  Hedging Your Security Bets with Cyberinsurance BASELINE 
MAG. (Aug. 9, 2002), in http://www.baselinemag.com/article2/0,3959,656097,00.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 
2004).  The strict assessment procedure can be very costly for firms.  For example, AlphaTrust Corp.’s 
(insured by Insuretrust) security assessment cost about $20,000, while Marsh’s security assessment cost 
$25,000.  Banham, supra note 73). 
81 Realizing that a stringent underwriting strategy can be onerous for buyers, insurers have recently toned 
down their rigorous stance.  For example, AIG introduced a three-level underwriting process:  (1) online 
application and, if the firm passes the criteria, a conditional price quote within 2 days, (2) online 
assessment upon completion of the security questionnaire and remote evaluation of its security by the 
technology partners, (3) full-blown physical assessment.  Insuredotcom.com developed an online 
questionnaire, comprising as many as 250 queries for CIOs, CFOs and legal counsels to fill out and get an 
idea of the price and how comprehensive the insurance will be, and decide whether to procure e-insurance 
or not.  The downside of a remote scan is that it doesn’t take into account the human-element issues and it 
doesn’t allow for an in depth inspection of the computer systems.  Id.  
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regulated business subject to high penalties like financial firms, are considered to be 
higher risk.
82  A typical cyberinsurer like American International Group (AIG), Inc., 
Marsh, or Insuretrust would categorize an applicant firm into one of several risk 
classifications and tie the premiums to the level of the firm’s security, giving discounts to 
those who have installed a professional security system.
83  Insurers also use monitoring of 
the firm’s security processes,
84 third-party security technology partners,
85 rewards for 
information leading to the apprehension of hackers,
86 and expense reimbursement for 
post-intrusion crisis-management activities. 
Security software vendor Tripwire, Inc. offers 10 percent premium discount on 
Lloyd’s of London’s e-Comprehensive cyberinsurance policy to customers who use their 
product.
87  Wurzler Underwriting Managers also offered clients 5 percent to 30 percent 
premium break if they use Linux or Unix servers rather than Windows NT because these 
systems are less susceptible to attack.
88  This premium has the result of encouraging 
software manufacturers to produce better software products.   
With regard to our theoretical discussions on cyberinsurance creating surplus for 
both insured and insurers, current industry estimates reveal a growing demand for 
cyberinsurance products   The Insurance Information Institute (I.I.I.) estimates that 
                                                 
82 Mullin, supra note 80. 
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cyberinsurance could become a $2.5 billion market by 2005.
89  IT-related policies, for 
instance, form 30%-40% of the policy mix for InsureHiTech.  As more insurers enter the 
market, driving down prices, coverages will broaden and user-friendliness will increase.   
However, the newly-introduced cyberinsurance schemes are not without 
problems.  The market has yet to reach its potential.  First, high costs -- premiums can 
range from $5,000 to $60,000 per $1 million of coverage -- makes it relatively beyond 
reach of small and medium-sized companies.
90 Second, underwriting qualifications lack 
standardization and remain complex and time-consuming.   Unlike traditional insurance 
where decades of information are available, e-risks have scant precedent.
91  Lack of 
actuarial or event data on all types of losses uncertainty as well as information over the 
potential worst-case damage liability present problems associated with calculation of 
risks and premium pricing.  Since insurers rely on measures of predictability to forecast 
probable risk and set prices, the absence of enough historical and actuarial data for 
Internet risks makes it harder to determine prices.
92  It takes both time and stability to 
develop statistical data for actuarial tables; at the Internet new ventures are developed at a 
fast pace, flaws in software change dynamically, and new attacks are released daily.  
Furthermore, future risks are unknown since both hackers and anti-hacking technology 
are getting better.
93   
One possible solution to the risk-assessment problem is the partnering of 
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insurance brokers with security service providers.
94 Another possibility is the 
coordination of regulation and standardizing the policies for computer-related coverage 
with the help of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a private, 
non-profit organization of insurance regulators.
95  The Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Board (CIPB) which was established by President Bush in October 2001, has developed a 
partnership with insurers to try to pool the data that exists in many sources within 
government and insurance industry to develop actuarial tables, a process that’s expected 
to continue into 2005.
96  Along the same lines, the CyberInsurance Institute has found 
two non-profit organizations (RAND and CERT) which are in the forefront on 
cybercommerce insurance standard developing methods for assessment of threats and 
vulnerabilities.
97   One other option to spur the widespread adoption of cyberinsurance is 
for the federal government to subsidize insurance for cyber-activities.
98   
IV.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The advent of the Internet has brought about new risks that traditional insurance 
policies do not satisfactorily cover.  The creation of new insurance products that 
specifically deals with Internet perils results in:  (a) better IT safety infrastructure and 
increased Internet security; (b) the standards for best practices and amount of due care to 
be set to optimal levels; and (c) providing a solution to a salient market failure which in 
turn brings overall welfare gains to society.  Our survey of the nascent and immature 
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cyberinsurance market provides a confirmation of the above-mentioned advantages that 
cyberinsurance can potentially generate for society at large. 